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Abstract
Tobacco taxes in the European Union are the highest in the world. These taxes are mainly
rationalized as a quid pro quo for the social costs of smoking. This paper argues that the
arguments are not as persuasive as is often believed. A more likely reason is that
governments are addicted to this lucrative and cheap source of revenue. The high taxes
involve trade diversion. In the EU, these aspects are overshadowed by the debate on the
most appropriate balance between specific and ad valorem taxation. Southern Member
States favor the ad valorem rate which tends to protect their cheap, home-grown tobaccos.
Northern Member States have a preference for specific taxation which is more favorable
to the exchequer, more effective in reducing the level of tobacco consumption, and
accords better with the competition objectives of the internal market.
71. Introduction
The health effects of smoking and the various tobacco-control measures used by
governments, including taxation, are very much in the news these days. An important
smoking gun is the recent publication of a joint study (Jha and Chaloupka, 2000) by the
World Bank (WB) and the World Health Organization (WHO) on the economic aspects
of tobacco use. Focusing in particular on developing countries, the WB/WHO study
advocates the following measures to curtail tobacco consumption: higher taxes,
comprehensive bans on the promotion and advertising of tobacco products, better and
more widely publicized research into the consequences of smoking, prominent warning
labels, deregulated access to nicotine-replacement therapies, and tight controls on
smuggling. In the study's wake, the WHO is promoting the adoption of a world-wide
treaty to control tobacco at a conference to be held in 2002.
This paper focuses on the tax aspects of tobacco-control measures with particular
reference to the European Union (EU). Tobacco taxes in the EU are the highest in the
world. The total tax (excises and value-added tax) on cigarettes is, on average, 75% of
the retail price which equals 300% of the retail price exclusive of tax. In comparison,
the value-added tax rate of, on average, 19%, which is also calculated on the price
exclusive of tax, is very modest indeed. By all accounts, revenue seems to be the main
reason for the extremely high taxes on tobacco. In many Member States, the yield of
tobacco taxes is close to 2% of total tax revenue (1% of GDP). No tax on any single
product contributes so much to revenue.
The high taxes on tobacco products are mainly rationalized as a quid pro quo for the
social costs of smoking. This paper reviews the arguments, but concludes that they are
not as persuasive as is often believed. Perhaps, a more likely reason is that governments
are addicted to this lucrative and cheap source of revenue. But high and different tax
burdens on cigarettes between Member States involve trade diversion. Obviously, the
stakes are high. In the EU, the various aspects are closely related to the structure of
tobacco taxation. The tobacco excise can be levied at a fixed amount per quantity
(specific rate), a fixed percentage of the retail price (ad valorem rate), or some
combination of these rates. The balance between specific and ad valorem taxation is an
issue that is deeply dividing the Member States. This paper believes that most
arguments tend to fall on the side of the specific rate. The paper deals mainly with taxes
on cigarettes which account for more than 90% of tobacco consumption in the EU.
2. Tobacco tax structure in the Netherlands
Over the years the Netherlands has seen one of the most spectacular shifts between
specific and ad valorem taxation, particularly during the 1980s. In the 1970s, the share
of the specific excise in total tax on cigarettes was only 5% and roll-your-own bore no
specific excise at all. The share was raised to 10% in 1980, 25% in 1984, and finally to
850% in 1987, applying to cigarettes as well as roll-your-own. The Dutch government
opted for a much heavier dose of the specific rate to bolster revenue from tobacco taxes
and to increase their predictability (Keen, 1998).
2.1 Current tax structure
The current cigarette tax structure in the Netherlands is shown in Table 1 which
specifies the retail price of 2 packs of cigarettes, brand A and brand B, that are sold for
euro 3.50 and euro 2.50, respectively. The retail price, inclusive of taxes, can be broken
down into the price exclusive of taxes (ex-factory cost plus profit and trade margins)
and the taxes, i.e. excises and value-added tax.
Table 1. The Netherlands: Specification of the Retail Price of Cigarettes
(in euro)
Brand A Brand B Difference
1. Retail price (p), including  taxes 3.50 2.50 1.00
2. Taxes
a. Specific excise (ts) 1.25 1.25 -.--
b. Ad valorem excise (ta1p) 0.72 0.51 0.21
c. Value-added tax (ta2p) 0.56 0.40 0.16
 d. Total (ts + tap) 2.53 2.16 0.37
3. Retail price (p), excluding taxes 0.97 0.34 0.63
In accordance with EU codification directive 95/59,1 the tax on cigarettes comprises
three elements.
· A specific excise, expressed as a fixed amount of euro 50.01 per 1000 cigarettes, or
euro 1.25 per pack of twenty-five.
· An ad valorem excise, levied at a fixed percentage, i.e. 20.51% of the retail price of
the most popular price category, also referred to as the reference price.
· The value-added tax of 19%, or 15.97% if expressed as a percentage of the retail
price inclusive of tax.
Obviously, the ad valorem excise and the value-added tax are fully identical in effect.
The value-added tax law in the Netherlands even has a clause stating that the value-
added tax on tobacco products will be levied as if it were the tobacco excise. Therefore,
only the sum of ad valorem excise and value-added tax, hereafter called ad valorem
levy, is relevant for the analysis.
                                                                
1 This directive codified the provisions of the harmonization directive of 1972 (72/464),
which aimed at approximating the rate structures, and the definition directive of 1978
(79/32), which provided uniform concepts for tobacco products.
92.2 Important ratios
From Table 1, a number of significant ratios can be derived.
· The total tax burden (T) on the most popular price category, say, brand A, is equal to
the ratio of the sum of all taxes, i.e. euro 2.53, to the retail price, i.e. euro 3.50, or
72% – approximately 260% of the trade price exclusive of taxes.
· The share (S) of the specific excise, i.e. euro 1.25, in total tax, i.e. euro 2.53, is close
to 50% – a percentage that plays an important role in the harmonization debate.
· The share (E) of the sum of the specific excise and the ad valorem excise, i.e. euro
1.97, in the retail price, i.e. euro 3.50, is close to 57% – the minimum required under
the acquis communautaire.
· The ratio (M) of the difference in retail price, including taxes, i.e. euro 1.00, to the
difference in retail price, excluding taxes, i.e. euro 0.63, is 1.6. More generally, this
figure, called the multiplier, means that for every euro increase in factory cost the
retail price has to be increased by euro 1.60.2 The multiplier increases with the sum
of ad valorem excise and value-added tax; it is independent of the specific excise.3
The various ratios can also be expressed algebraically. If the retail price is denoted by
(p), the specific excise by (t s), the sum of ad valorem excise (ta1p) and value-added tax
(ta2p) by (tap), the total tax burden by (T), the share of the specific excise in total tax by
(S), the share of the sum of ts and ta1p in the retail price by (E), and the multiplier by
(M), then the various ratios can be expressed as follows:
T = (ts + tap)/p;
S = ts/(ts + tap);
E = (ts + ta1p)/p; and
M = 1/(1 – ta) = 1/[1 – T(1 – S)].
3. Europe an Union
The ratios derived in the previous section play an important role in the debate on the
harmonization of the tobacco taxes in the EU. So far, little progress has been made. Tax
structures still differ widely from one Member State to the other.
                                                                
2 Based on the precise rates shown in Table 2, the sum of the ad valorem excise and the
value-added tax is 36.48% of the retail price which is 58.43% of the price exclusive of
these taxes.
3 The trade margin also functions as an ad valorem rate for the producer if it is set at a
fixed percentage of the retail price. Fixed percentages are legislated in Belgium, France,
Portugal, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain.
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3.1 Tobacco tax harmonization
In 1972, just before the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (all
specific excise rate countries!), the EU reached agreement on the harmonization of the
cigarette excise in three stages. In the first stage, the share of the specific excise would
have to lie in the range of 5-75%; in the second stage, 5-55%; and in the third stage, 5-
35%. The second stage started 1 July 1978, but the third stage has never been
implemented. Instead, the second stage has been extended repeatedly, and in the 1986
the implementation of the third stage (which was originally planned for 1 January
1980!) was removed from the directive. Currently, the 5-55% band is still in effect. In
other words, hardly any progress has been made on the alignment of the specific excise
rates.
The stalemate in the early 1980s manifested itself in a controversy between the
European Commission  and the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) of the
European Parliament. The Commission (1982) wanted harmonization to proceed on the
basis of the ratio of the specific excise to total tax; in the end the ratio should become
some 20%. ECOSOC (1981), on the other hand, favoured harmonization on the basis of
the ad valorem excise. At a given tax burden, this appears to be a case of six of one and
half a dozen of the other, because the sum of the proportional elements equals the tax
burden multiplied by one minus the ratio of specific excise to total tax.
But as Kay and Keen (1982) point out, the different positions represented more subtle
points of view.4 The proposal of the Commission implied a multiplier of 3
(corresponding to an ad valorem rate of about 56%), while ECOSOC had a multiplier of
2 in mind, which implied an ad valorem rate of 40% (inclusive of value-added tax) and
a ratio of specific excise to total tax of 43%. In other words, an increase in the tax
burden on cigarettes, under the Commission's proposal, would involve an increase in the
ad valorem rate, whereas an increase in total tax, under ECOSOC's proposal, would
involve an increase in the specific excise. The controversy was not resolved.
The matter was tabled again with the publication, in 1985, of the Commission's White
Paper on Completing  the Internal Market. On the basis of the arithmetic averages of the
Member States, in 1987, the Commission proposed to harmonize the specific rate at
euro 19.5 per thousand5 and the ad valorem rate at 52-54%. Again, ECOSOC (1988)
rejected the proposal of the Commission, concluding that "the existing structures and
rates do not provide a sound basis for tobacco duties in a single, border free market." It
was argued that the proposal violated competition policy, would force some Member
states to raise the tax, and would be detrimental to poor Member States.
                                                                
4 Although nearly 20 years old, Kay and Keen's 1982 analysis is still up-to-date on the
issues.
5 Value figures originally denoted in ecu are shown in euro on a one-to-one basis.
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Without paying attention to ECOSOC's opinion, in 1989 the Commission (89/55, final)
proposed the introduction, over the long term, of an indexed specific rate of euro 21.5
per thousand cigarettes and a combined ad valorem levy (excise and value-added tax) of
54%. Effective 1 January 1993, these rates would have to be euro 15 and 45%,
respectively. The draft directive of the Commission was discussed in the Council of
Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) in Luxembourg on 24 June 1991. After the
smoke cleared, agreement had been reached on the following points:6
· The maintenance of the earlier agreed acquis communautaire of 5-55% as regards
the share of the specific excise in total tax (S).
· A total excise burden (E), specific and ad valorem, of at least 57% of the retail price.
· The application of the standard rate of value-added tax which would have to be at
least 15%, or 13.04% inclusive of value-added tax.
Soon it transpired, however, that the 57%-criterion forced high-excise member states to
increase their excises when an increase in the ex-factory cost led to an increase in retail
price which resulted in the overall excise falling below the 57% minimum. To avoid a
situation in which the dog would be chasing its own tail, the European Commission
(1995) recommended the Council and the Parliament to amend the codification directive
so that Member States whose absolute level of excise duty on cigarettes was greater than
euro 60 per 1,000 cigarettes would be allowed to let their national rate fall below 57% of
the retail selling price. This recommendation was followed by directive 99/81 that
permitted a number of derogations from the 57%-criterion.
3.2 EU tobacco tax structures
To date, this is where matters stand. Accordingly, Table 2 presents an overview of taxes
on cigarettes in all 15 member states of the European Union. The Table provides
interesting information on the similarities and differences between northern and
southern Member States.7
                                                                
6 In implementing the agreement, Member States tried to keep the number of changes to a
minimum. Changes in specific and ad valorem excise rates could be offsetting as long as
the 57%-criterion was satisfied. Also, increases in value-added tax rates could be
compensated by reductions of ad valorem excises and vice versa .
7 Austria, Finland, Portugal, and Sweden are odd man out with divided loyalties. In recent
years, Sweden has shifted the tax balance to the ad valorem rate, while Portugal has
opted for a heavier dose of the specific rate. For an account of the confusing
developments in Sweden, see Joossens et al. (2000).
Table 2. Taxes on cigarettes in the European Union as of January 2001
                    
                                                             ----- Proportional elements -----      ------- Absolute amounts -------    ----------------------- Important ratios ----------------------
                                                                    (% of retail price)                                 (euro/thousand)
Member Statea Specific
excise
(euro/
thousand
(ts)
Ad
valore
m
excise
(ta1)
VAT
(ta2)
Total
ad valorem
levy
(ta= ta1+ta2)
Total
excise
(ts+ta1p
)
Total
tax
(ts+tap)
Retail price
(p)
Tax
burden
(%)
p
ptt
 T as
+
=
Share of
specific excise
in total tax (%)
ptt
t
S
as
s
+
=
Share of total
excise in retail
price (%)
p
ptt
E a1s
+
=
Multiplier
at1
1
M
-
=
Specific rates
     United Kingdom 150.94 22.00 14.89 36.89 228 281 352 80 54 65 1.6
     Ireland 102.84 18.57 17.36 35.93 146 187 234 80 55 62 1.6
     Denmark   81.40 21.22 20.00 41.22 124 164 201 82 50 62 1.7
     Netherlands   50.01 20.51 15.97 36.48 78 100 137 73 50 57 1.6
     Germany   47.14 21.96 13.79 35.75 77   95 135 71 50 57 1.6
Ad valorem rates
     France     5.79 54.50 17.08 71.58 86 112 148 76   5 58 3.5
     Belgium   15.72 45.84 17.36 63.20 80 105 141 74 15 57 2.7
     Luxembourg   10.59 46.84 10.71 57.55 59   71 104 68 15 57 2.4
     Italy     3.57 54.26 16.67 70.93 55   71   96 75   5 58 3.4
     Greece     3.48 53.86 15.25 69.11 55   70   96 73   5 58 3.2
     Spain            3.01 54.00 13.79 67.79 48   60   84 71   5 58 3.1
Mavericks
     Sweden   23.45 39.20 20.00 59.20 105 147 208 70 16 50 2.5
     Finland   15.14 50.00 18.03 68.03 110 144 189 76 11 58 3.1
     Austria   18.53 42.00 16.67 58.67 69   89 120 74 21 58 2.4
     Portugalc   28.93 32.00 14.53 46.53 57   70   87 80 42 65 1.9
Source: European Commission, Excise Duty Tables, January 2001, Brussels: Directorate General of Taxation and Customs Union.
a Ranked within each group by total tax on cigarettes.
b Value of the most popular price category (MPPC) in January 2001.
c Portugal may apply a reduced rate of up to 50% less than the overall minimum rate to cigarettes consumed in the most remote regions of the Azores
and Madeira,
made by small-scale manufacturers each of whose annual production does not exceed 500 metric tons (Article 3.2 of Directive 92/79/EEC).
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· In all Member States, the total tax burden (T) clusters around 75% of the retail price,
or 300% of the retail price exclusive of tax;
· In the northern Member States, the share (S) of the specific excise in total tax lies
close to the upper limit of the agreed band of 5-55%. In the southern Member States,
by contrast, the share of the specific excise is close to the lower limit of 5%. The
situation with respect to the ad valorem excise and the value-added tax is the other
way around: on average, 37.3% of the retail price in the northern Member States as
opposed to, on average, 66.7% in the southern Member States.
· In all Member States, except Sweden, the share (E) of the specific and ad valorem
excises in the retail price is 57 percent or higher.8
· Approximately equal relative total tax burdens, but large differences in the share of
the sum of ad valorem excise and value-added tax in total tax, imply large
differences in multipliers (M). In the northern Member States, M clusters around the
value 1.6; in the southern Member States, M fluctuates around 3.1.
· Although relative total tax burdens are close to each other, substantial differences
show up in the absolute amounts of total tax burdens and retail prices. The northern
Member States levy, on average, euro 165 tax per 1000 cigarettes (of which, euro 86
from the specific rate) against euro 82 by the southern Member States (of which,
euro 7 from the specific rate). Not surprisingly, retail prices average euro 212 and
euro 112 per thousand, respectively – a difference of euro 2.50 per pack of 25
cigarettes.
As these figures indicate, a veritable smoke screen is hanging across the EU. On the north
side, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have dug in
to defend their specific excises. Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain
are entrenched on the south side staunchly clinging on to their ad valorem rates. What
then is the most appropriate balance between specific and ad valorem taxation? As argued
below, the answer to this question depends on whether there are social costs to smoking
that should be internalized, on government's health objectives, revenue goals, and on the
EU's competition policies.
4. Social costs, health policies, and tax burden distribution
Smoking, like bad eating habits and lack of exercise, has detrimental effects on a
person's health. Nonetheless, the principle of consumer sovereignty implies that a
rational person who weighs up all the costs and benefits of his actions should be free to
smoke as long as he does not impose costs on others and is fully informed about his
choice. In other words, from an efficiency point of view, there would be no external and
internal costs. External or social costs occur, for instance, when the behavior of 'active'
smokers affects the health of 'passive' smokers. Internal costs or information failures
arise when smokers, especially teenagers, are not (fully) aware of the health risks of
                                                                
8 Sweden was permitted a derogation under directive 99/81.
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smoking or the addictive potential of tobacco. Prima facie, social costs and information
failures establish a case for government intervention.
Social costs can be accounted for through the tax system by imposing a tax on cigarettes
to the amount of the cost of the damage caused to the health of other people. Ideally, the
tax should be equivalent to the marginal external cost per cigarette consumed. This cost,
however, depends on who smokes what, where, and under what circumstances.
Obviously, this kind of information is simply not available and, even if it were, it would
not be feasible to impose a separate tax on each cigarette that goes up in smoke. In
practice, therefore, an 'insurance' approach is adopted in charging for the social costs of
smoking. Similar to car insurance, smokers as a group meet these costs by paying a
uniform tax on tobacco products (O'Hagan, 1998).
The appropriate level of this uniform tax per, say, pack of cigarettes, should depend, of
course, on the total amount of the social costs of smoking divided by the number of
packs consumed. On the basis of a careful review of a large number of studies,
Lightwood et al. (2000) estimate that the gross costs of health care related to tobacco
use – i.e. all costs in any given year that can be attributed to the extra health care needs
of smokers – range from 0.1 to 1.1.% of GDP in high-income countries.9 Smokers,
however, tend to live shorter than nonsmokers which saves on pension payments and
health care costs of age-related diseases. From an economic point of view, therefore, it
is net costs, which assess health care costs over a life-cycle, that should be the focus of
analysis. Subject to a number of methodological caveats, Lightwood et al. (2000)
conclude that the majority of the cross-section studies indicate that the net costs of
smoking are positive.10 These net costs are in the nature of a subsidy paid by
nonsmokers to smokers who have higher lifetime health care costs than nonsmokers.
These net costs are imposed on nonsmokers only, i.e. are in the nature of social costs, if
smokers do not pay for them, either directly or indirectly through tobacco taxes (and/or
higher health insurance premiums). Prima facie, tobacco tax revenues in the EU, shown
in Table 3, are a multiple of the net costs, if any, of smoking.
The previous figures are aggregates. There remains the problem that smokers impose
social costs, mainly in the form of irritation, on specific nonsmoking individuals whose
                                                                
9 The higher estimates are found in countries where health care costs account for a
relatively large share of GDP. As regards EU Member States, research in the United
Kingdom for 1986-87 estimated gross costs at between 0.08 and 0.13% of GDP.
Furthermore, gross costs in Finland for 1987 were estimated at 0.07-0.08% of GDP. For
the references, see Lightwood et al. (2000).
10 An exception is a study for Finland (Pekurinen, 1992) which concludes that smoking
involves net health care costs savings.  In a similar vein, Atkinson and Townsend (1977)
found that the actual cost savings to the UK exchequer from a hypothetical 40%
reduction in cigarette smoking were relatively small.
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company they share.11 These costs, however, cannot really be addressed through the tax
system. They are better taken care off through regulatory devices, such as smoking bans
in public places. Similarly, there is little role for taxation if lack of information is the
central problem. This problem is best addressed through prominent warning labels and
the dissemination of the health hazards of smoking through the media. Lack of
information should not now be an issue in any EU Member State. Based on evidence
from the US, it may be assumed that over 90% of consumers are aware of the long-term
health effects of smoking.
If the social costs of smoking are negligible, government measures to reduce smoking
would seem a form of paternalism on which economics has little to say. But, as Peck et
al. (2000) point out, the fact that nicotine is addictive undermines the consumer-
sovereignty argument against government intervention. The rationality condition ceases
to apply, because the addicted smoker is to some extent a different person from the one
who decided to start smoking. To these authors, this justifies the formulation of public
health objectives aimed at reducing the level and number of smokers, among other
methods through the tax system.
Higher taxes are particularly effective in reducing the incidence of smoking among
teenagers, even though taxes are second-best to better education about the addictive
nature of smoking and its long-term costs. Research (Chaloupka et al., 2000) indicates
that the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in high-income countries is, on average,
-0.8% among the young, compared with, on average, -0.4% among adults. Generally,
teenagers are better able to kick the habit (the addiction has not taken hold), more
susceptible to peer pressure, and subject to greater budget constraints. Estimates for the
US suggest that a tax increase of $2 per pack would reduce overall youth smoking by
about two-thirds.12 It is difficult to rationalize, however, why tax increases should
penalize habitual smokers. As Shoup (1983) notes: "If … we put aside the problem of
negative externalities, there seems to be no acceptable principle that justifies higher
taxation of addicts."
If there is a (residual) case for government intervention through the tax system, then the
specific excise is a better instrument to raise the cost of cigarettes than an ad valorem
levy. The specific excise has a price effect which cannot be avoided by the
manufacturer and the consumer. As a result the total volume of cigarettes consumed
tends to be lower the greater is the ratio of specific to total tax (Keen, 1998). A specific
excise, moreover does not tax items other than tobacco, such as wrappers or coal filters,
which do not contribute to the generation of social costs, if any, and whose value,
                                                                
11 There is great uncertainty regarding the health risks of passive smoking which has been
called one of the greatest hoaxes of modern times.
12 Particularly for adults, the effect of a permanent increase in price will be greater in the
long run than in the short run, because current consumption depends to a large extent on
past consumption.
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therefore, should not be included in the excise base. In addition, a specific excise, based
on the weight of tobacco (like the excise on roll-your-own and pipe tobacco in the
Netherlands), is a better internalization instrument than is the current excise, which is
related to the number of cigarettes.
If tobacco taxes cannot be justified on externality grounds, then they flaunt horizontal
and vertical equity notions. In the EU, only 38% of men and 21% of women pay
tobacco taxes. Moreover, smoking, and therefore the burden of tobacco taxation, is
becoming increasingly concentrated in lower income classes. In the United Kingdom,
smoking prevalence follows a continuous upward gradient from high to low socio-
economic groups (Bobak et al., 2000). While the poor were the last to pick up smoking,
they are also the last to quit. In short, tobacco taxes are highly discriminatory and
regressive, more so than any other tax. It is impossible, moreover, to adjust for these
shortcomings through the income tax and social benefit systems.
5. Revenue considerations
Although tobacco taxes are difficult to justify on externality grounds, they have always
been a lucrative and cheap source of revenue for governments. The addictive nature of
nicotine implies a low price elasticity of demand and, among smokers, a large sales
volume. Under these circumstances, a tax increase will nearly always guarantee higher
revenue. To illustrate, assume that the long run price elasticity of demand for cigarettes
is constant at -0.4 and that cigarettes are taxed at 75% of the retail price. In this
situation, a tax increase of 10% that is fully passed on to consumers would reduce
demand by 3%, but raise cigarette tax revenue by 4.3%. In oligopolistic markets,
moreover, a tax increase will most likely be overshifted (Keen, 1998; Harris, 1987). If
so, the multiplier effect might then result in a tax increase greater than 5.6%. Beyond
that, collection costs are relatively low because the number of producers is small.
Although, over the years, revenues from taxes on tobacco have declined in relative
terms, they cannot be neglected as an important revenue source in the EU, as shown in
Table 3. In the northern Member States, revenue from excises and value-added tax on
tobacco products in 1998 was, on average, 0.9% of GDP (2.4 % of total tax revenue).
The ratio was highest in Ireland (1.32% of GDP) and lowest in the Netherlands (0.51%).
In the southern Member States, revenue from excises and value-added tax was, on
average, 0.6% of GDP (1.3% of total tax revenue).13 In this group, France led (0.69% of
GDP) and Greece closed ranks (0.17%).
                                                                
13 Luxembourg has been left out in calculations for the southern Member States. This
country's tobacco tax revenue is very high, because it engages in considerable tax base
snatching from neighboring countries by following a low tax/high turnover sales strategy.
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Table 3. European Union: Tobacco tax revenues (1998) a and smuggling (1995)
Member States Percent of
total tax
revenue
Percent
of GDP
Price/
pack
(euro)
Smuggling
as % of
domestic
sales
Corruption
indexb
Specific rates
      United Kingdom 3.0 1.10 8.80 2 8.7
      Ireland 4.1 1.32 5.85 4 8.2
      Denmark 1.7 0.86 5.03 na 10.0
      Netherlands 1.3 0.51 3.43 8 9.0
      Germany 1.9 0.71 3.38 10 7.9
Ad valorem rates
      France 1.5 0.69 3.70 2 6.7
      Belgium 1.5 0.68 3.53 7 5.4
      Luxembourg 5.1 2.08 2.60 7 5.4
      Italy 1.7 0.72 2.40 12 4.6
      Greece 0.5 0.17 2.40 8 4.9
      Spain na na 2.10 15 6.1
Mavericks
     Sweden 1.1 0.56 5.20 2 9.5
     Finland 1.4 0.64 4.73 na 9.6
     Austria 1.7 0.75 3.00 15 7.5
     Portugal 0.4 0.12 2.18 na 6.5
Sources : Individual country tables in OECD (2000) and Table 15.3 in Merriman et al.
(2000).
a Excises and value-added tax. Total tobacco tax revenue has been calculated by multiplying
actual excise revenues shown in OECD by Rt/Re, in which Rt and Re are the total tax and total
excise yield, respectively, as calculated in Table 2.
b Perception index ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean), based on surveys of
business people, risk analysts, and the general public.
The differences in revenue should mainly be attributed to differences in absolute tax
burdens (as well as consumption and income). Per pack of cigarettes, revenue in Italy is
only one quarter of revenue in the United Kingdom. At first sight, it may be thought that
this has nothing to do with the nature of the rate. At a retail price of, for example, euro
3.50, a specific rate of euro 1.75 raises as much revenue as an ad valorem rate of 50%.
This reasoning, however, bypasses the fact that the equality of specific and ad valorem
rates holds only if all characteristics of the product, except volume, are the same and the
price before tax is determined exogenously.
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The characteristics of tobacco, however, are not the same, nor is there a pure monopoly.
Someone who smokes knows that there are large differences in quality. A Virginia
tastes better than two sticks of saw dust. Interestingly, it is the interaction between the
ad valorem rate and quality which detrimentally affects revenue. In contrast to the
specific rate, the ad valorem rate will induce manufacturers to decrease the price of their
product by lowering its quality.14 By contrast, a specific rate, applying to cheap as well
as expensive tobaccos, will induce consumers to upgrade their choice of cigarettes,
because the relative price of high-quality cigarettes falls. Not surprisingly, southern
Member States with high ad valorem levies market cigarettes of lower quality at lower
prices.15 At a given volume of consumption, this implies less tax revenue.
A disadvantage of a specific rate is that, unlike the case of an ad valorem rate, its
revenue does not fluctuate in tandem with movements in the price level. In case of
inflation, the real revenue of a specific excise that is not adjusted will be eroded. To
avoid this effect, the specific rate can be adjusted periodically for increases (or
decreases) in the price index of tobacco or for changes in the general price index. The
general price index is favoured, because the issue concerns the maintenance of the real
level of revenue, not the level which fluctuates with the price of tobacco. Moreover, if
the specific rate has been chosen in order to internalize the social costs of smoking, then
these costs are obviously more likely to vary with the general price level than with the
price of tobacco. Logic also dictates the use of the general price index. After all, if the
specific rate is indexed for movements in the price index of tobacco, then the result is an
ad valorem rate.
Finally, as noted by Kay and Keen (1982), it is of interest to point out that governments
interested solely in revenue would probably wish to keep the retail price as low as
possible under a specific regime, so as not to depress sales volume. Under an ad
valorem regime, on the other hand, governments have an interest in keeping the retail
price as high as possible. This suggests that there is a combined rate at which revenue is
independent of retail price. This situation occurs if the share of the ad valorem levy in
                                                                
14 For the formal proof, see Kay and Keen (1983). The authors note: "Profit maximizing
choice of quality requires that the after-tax marginal revenue from an increase in quality
with output held constant be equal to the associated marginal cost; an increase in the ad
valorem rate reduces this net marginal revenue, and under the usual regularity conditions
- which here correspond to the requirement that consumers' willingness to pay for
successive increases in quality decreases with the initial quality level - quality must fall to
restore the equality."
15 Also, this follows from the formula: T = (t s + ta p)/p, in which a higher ad valorem rate, at
a given tax burden, implies a lower retail price.
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total tax is equal to the price elasticity of demand.16 If the price elasticity equals -0.4,
then the ad valorem levy should generate two-thirds of the revenue of the specific rate.
This implies a multiplier of nearly 1.7.
6. Internal market
From the beginning, the southern Member States, under France's leadership, have tried
to practically eliminate the specific element of the tobacco excise in favor of the ad
valorem element. The reason is protection.17 The tobaccos of the southern Member
States are cheaper than the higher quality American blends that the northern Member
States import for their consumers. An ad valorem rate protects the inferior tobacco.
After all, the multiplier effect enables producers to conduct a pricing policy, such that a
difference in the price of the raw material of, for instance, euro 1.00 per kilogram is
blown up to a difference of euro 3.50 per kilogram at the consumer level. It is difficult
to rationalize this with the free competition policy of the internal market.
The balance between specific and ad valorem taxation is also important for the
prevention of trade diversion in the form of bootlegging (the legal purchase of cigarettes
in a country other than the country of consumption) and smuggling. Bootlegging and
smuggling can only be prevented if price differentials between Member States are not
too large. While differences in price exclusive of tax are relatively minor, differences in
price inclusive of tax are enormous. And, of course, the latter differences determine
how advantageous it is to buy cigarettes across the border or to trade cigarettes
illegally.18 To illustrate, Table 3 indicates that the reference price of cigarettes is euro
5.03 in Denmark, but only 2.60 in Luxembourg, a spread to the tune of euro 2.43 per
pack. The temptation to illegally exploit this price differentials is enormous. A trip from
Luxembourg to Copenhagen with a 7.5 ton lorry loaded with 1.5 million cigarettes
(60,000 packs) yields gross profits of euro 146.000. The net proceeds of a day trip with
the same lorry from the duchy to Amsterdam are approximately euro 57.000.
                                                                
16 As Kay and Keen (1982) show, if, at a given price (p), tax revenue from cigarettes is
denoted by (R(p)) and the demand by (D(p)), then R(p) = (ts+tap)D(p). Tax revenue will then
be independent of price if ta p/ (ts + ta p)= E(p), in which E(p) denotes the price elasticity of
demand.
17 This situation resembles the approach to alcohol taxation in France which used to levy
low excises on spirits made from grapes, e.g. cognac, but high excises on spirits made
from grains, e.g. gin. Since grain-based spirits were mainly imported, the approach
protected home-made spirits. The European Court of Justice ruled, however, that the
excise should be based on alcohol content rather than the raw material.
18 Research indicates that smokers will buy cigarettes across the border if the price
differential is euro 0.15 or more per pack. In the EU, a little over 12% of the population
lives near inter-EU frontiers, i.e. within a distance of 30 km of a neighboring Member
State. Therefore, the effect of tax differentials on sales and revenue, could be substantial.
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That the increase in legal and illegal trade in cigarettes after 1992, implied by these
examples, is not imaginary is shown by research in the United States on the
consequences of differences in taxes on cigarettes (Price Waterhouse, 1991). In 1989,
taxes on cigarettes (federal excise, state excise and retail sales tax) ranged from $0.03
cents per pack in North Carolina to $0.48 in Minnesota and average retail prices from
$2.25 in Atlanta to $1.35 in Kentucky. As a result of the tax-induced diversion of
cigarette purchases, the various treasuries lost some $179 million in revenue in 1989.
Furthermore, it was estimated that some 620 million packs (2.4% of all sales) were
traded illegally. More seriously, the mafia has cornered the illegal trade in cigarettes.
In line with these findings, Merriman et al. (2000) estimate that in a European country
with the mean level of incentive, bootlegged imports account for about 3% of domestic
consumption. Cross-border and tourist shopping in the United Kingdom amounts to
approximately 0.5% of cigarette sales and 3% of hand-rolling tobacco sales. In Finland
12% of domestic sales come from bootlegged imports. In addition, the unweighted
average for smuggling as a percentage of in-State consumption is about 7.7% in the EU
(Table 3); the population weighted average is 8.9%. Smuggled imports should be
negatively correlated with enforcement activities in local markets.19 The corruption
index shown in Table 3 is an indication of  the quality of these activities. Finally, the
European Commission (1998) reports that over 50 criminal networks have been
identified by investigations of large-scale smuggling of various products, including
tobacco products.
Bootlegging  in the EU can only be brought down by narrowing price differences
between cigarettes. Since a specific rate has only a price effect, it should be a more
effective means to narrow price differences than an ad valorem rate would be.
Furthermore, illegal practices can be countered by levying the excise as early as
possible in the production-distribution chain and by severing the link between excise
and retail price. These considerations emphasize the desirability of a specific rate. If the
excise were levied at the producer level and if the member state of production would not
be the same as the member state of consumption, then origin states could be obliged to
pay the excise and value added tax of the destination state. This could be done by
requiring the manufacturer to buy banderols from the consumer country's excise
administration.
7. Concluding comments
This paper has shown that conflicting interests – mainly revenue and protection – lead
to widely diverging balances between specific and ad valorem taxation. Most northern
Member States want to retain an important role for the specific excise which tends to be
                                                                
19 Merriman et al. (2000) find that corruption in a country is a stronger indicator of cigarette
smuggling than price.
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more favourable to the exchequer, may be more effective in reducing the level of
tobacco consumption, and accords better with the competition objectives of the internal
market. Most southern Member States, by contrast, want to make the excise almost
exclusively ad valorem, because an ad valorem rate protects the cultivation of their low-
priced home grown tobaccos. But if it would be desirable to provide income support to
growers of tobacco, then it would be far better to do so directly than through the excise
structure.
Thus far, the tobacco tax harmonization proposals have not narrowed price differentials
between member states. After the elimination of border controls in 1993, the trade in
cigarettes (and tax revenues) has been diverted to Member States with low absolute tax
levels; in other words, Member States with high ad valorem rates. As a consequence,
the internal trade in cigarettes in the EU is driven mainly by differences in the levels of
taxation rather than, as is the objective, by differences in production costs. The only
way to narrow these differences is to proceed with harmonization mainly on the basis of
specific rates. An incidental, if welcome, side effect would be that greater reliance on
the specific excise would augment revenue (and permit the reduction of other, more
distortionary, taxes) and promote public health objectives. If this paper has contributed
to a better understanding of these issues, then its message will not have gone up in
smoke.
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